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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the possibilities of intergenerational risk sharing in a generational
DB pension fund. Each generation is subject to discretionary investment, indexation and con-
tribution policies, thereby losing intergenerational diversication gains. Intergenerational risk
sharing is repaired by introducing contingent claims on the generational surplus or decit. We
nd that in some circumstances the values of these options can be substantial.
The authors thank participants in the RSM Ph.D. seminar at Erasmus University, and Research Conference on
Risk Sharing in DC Pension Schemes" at Exeter University for valuable comments. The paper was written when
both authors were at Erasmus University, the Netherlands. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a generational pension plan design, in which some degree of individu-
alization can be realized at the level of a single generation, while at the same time advantages
of economies of scale are present. The economies of scale can be achieved by pooling investment
and operational strategies from the dierent generations. Compared with a pure collective dened
benet plan without any generational discretion, the new generational design provides no intergen-
erational risk sharing. As intergenerational risk sharing is an important feature of a pension design
we explore in this chapter whether risk sharing can be improved by introducing explicit contingent
claims contracts.
A generational pension plan consists of multiple generational funds. Each generational fund
serves one particular generation regarding its contribution, indexation and investment policies. A
generational fund is a self-nanced fund in the sense that no transfers are possible. When the assets
of a particular fund are lower than its liabilities, fund participants run the risk of having to accept
lower benets during retirement. On the contrary, when the fund has a surplus after having paid all
promised benets, it has to forego this terminal surplus.1 These make two possible consequences of
the absence of risk sharing among generations. In order to make risk sharing possible and explicit
we introduce contingent claims that individual generations can trade with each other. By buying
a benet guarantee or put options on future expected benet payments participants can insure
themselves against downside risks that cannot be diversied within a generation. More specically
the pension put protects the participants against less-than-promised pension payments. Secondly,
by writing a call option on the surplus of its terminal assets, after all pension payments are made,
a particular generation can sell its surplus assets to other generations. In this chapter we use the
setup of a generational conditional DB fund to evaluate both these contingent claims.
Allowing for contingent claims to be traded among generational funds greatly improves the
possibilities for intergenerational risk sharing. In a way the identication of these claims makes
the collection of individual generational funds resemble a traditional collective dened benet plan.
An important dierence between the generational plan and the traditional collective plan is that
1For example, the fund gets a windfall in its last period investment or its participants die earlier than expected.
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in the latter plan all generations adopt the same contribution, investment and indexation policies,
while in the generational plan these policies still dier across generations. From this perspective a
traditional collective plan can be seen as a special case of a generational plan.
To facilitate intergenerational risk sharing via contingent claims, the contracts need to be traded
among generational funds within an umbrella parent plan. The claims cannot be traded with
counterparties outside the parent plan due to moral hazard problem. We assume a complete
market in the sense that all types of payos, especially the liabilities, can be replicated within this
internal market.2 Within a complete market we can apply traditional valuation methods for the
contingent claims.
The benet guarantees in our setup dier from the guarantees discussed in Pennacchi (1999),
Feldstein & Ranguelova (2000), and Lachance, Mitchell & Smetters (2003) in two aspects. The
benet guarantee is a compound option that has payos in each of the retirement years. Secondly,
both the underlying asset and the strike price of the guarantees are time-varying and depend on the
particular contribution, indexation and investment policies of the generational fund. Therefore we
use a Monte Carlo simulation to value the options. In addition, we analyze three types of benet
guarantees that respectively provide nominal, accrued rights and real benets as a minimum.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we briey describe a generational
dened benet pension plan, and introduce the design of the contingent claims. We clarify how
intergenerational risk sharing can be achieved in our setup and how value transfers occur. Section
3 presents the specics of a generational DB fund and the resulting payo structures for the claims.
Section 4 presents our empirical setup and discusses the approach for valuation. In Section 5 results
are presented and discussed. Section 6 concludes this chapter.
2Our assumption of a complete market is somewhat restrictive. In particular, labor income and longevity risks are
dicult to hedge within the composite generational plan. However, in this chapter we abstract from an incomplete
market setting.
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2 Generational pension plans and risk sharing
2.1 A generational pension plan
In our setup a generational pension plan consists of a number of generational accounts. Each
account serves to provide pension services to one specic generation. When a person enters the
plan, he/she will enter the appropriate generational account and will stay in this account until
death.3 A distinctive property of each generational account is that contribution, indexation and
investment policies can be set independently. This distinguishes the generational plan from the
traditional collective plan where participants across all living generations share uniform policies
and are highly susceptible to dierential treatment. The umbrella parent plan only species the
level of annual nominal accrued rights.
In order to focus the discussion we assume that a dened benet plan can be divided into N
generational accounts. Each account n = 1; : : : ; N is responsible for its investment, contribution
and indexation policies. A time index t = T0; : : : ; Td indicates the age of the members in the
account. At age T0 the rst members enter the account and at age Td the last member dies.
A xed retirement date is set at Tr, with T0  Tr  Td.4 The nominal benet is set by the
parent plan in the form of an annual nominal pension benet accrual ARnt, which we assume to be
representative for all people in generation n. Contributions are accumulated into an asset account
Ant, which needs to be invested.
An important feature is that each generation can make its own decisions regarding the level of
annual contributions and indexation. In order to prevent opportunistic behavior each generation has
to x its strategy by writing a policy ladder at the inception (t = T0) of the account. These strategies
are typically conditional on the funding ratio of the generation: Ant=PV (
P
ARnt). Intuitively, the
higher this ratio, the more indexation can be granted, and the lower the contributions can be.
The policy ladders of the generation need to be approved by the parent plan. Furthermore, each
generation can decide upon rules on how to allocate the investments accumulated in the generational
3A person can leave the account only when she leaves the organization that provides the pension arrangement
(company/government), and transfers the accrued pension rights to another pension plan. We do not consider these
transfers in this paper.
4In the simulations later in this chapter we set T0 = 25, Tr = 65, and Td = 80.
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account. The guideline regarding investment decision should also be made at the inception of the
account5. For example, the fund can draft guidelines whether they adopt age-dependent investment
policy or funding ratio-dependent policy. These pre-set rules on investment policy are necessary in
valuing latent options.
In general the nancial situation of the n-th generational account at time t from the perspective
of participants can be represented by the following
P
ARnt
P
(C +R)ntP
ARnt represents the pension benets received by participants, and
P
(C + R)nt represents the
amount that participants have accumulated by contributions and investments. The dierence
between these two is the transfer (Xnt) that this account gives away to other generations. Xnt can
be positive or negative, depending on the pension deal.
2.2 Option designs
For a generational fund that adopts a DC deal, its participants receive any pension benets out
of the fund assets they have accumulated. The nominal benets suer from uncertainty mainly
caused by three sources: investment risk, mortality risk and labor income risk. The real pension
benets bear additionally the ination risk. For a generational fund choosing a DB deal, it has
to handle these risks to make the promised benet payments. The fund can adjust its investment
policy to reduce investment risk. However, there are pan-generation risks such as war outbreak
or long-running economic depression that may not be diversied away within the generation itself.
Regarding the mortality risk rising from uncertain death time of individuals, the idiosyncratic part
of this risk can be diversied away within a generation. For example, some individuals die earlier
while others die later than expected. The benet payouts saved from the early death can supplement
the payment to the late death. This is also the so-called intra-generational risk sharing. However,
the systematic part of this risk, also referred as longevity risk, can not be diversied away within a
generation. Longevity risk refers to the uncertainty in the life expectancy of a generation. The life
5This may be very restricted. To allow varying investment policy will increase the complication of valuing fund-
related options. In this paper we aim to give a rst approximate of the option value, therefore we restrain ourselves
from injecting too many complications.
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expectancy is an important assumption in setting the contribution rate. If the life expectancy of a
generation is longer than the assumption, a generational fund will run short of assets to pay for the
extra living years. The fund may buy a longevity linked bond in the open market but such securities
are scarcely available currently6. The labor income risk refers to the mismatch risk between assets
and liabilities that arises from the stochastic future income. The stochastic income inuences the
cash inow of contributions and is also an important factor in determining the dened benets
for a given replacement rate. Unfortunately the current market does not provide income-linked
securities. Thus the hedge against this risk also needs to be provided by other generations.
To protect the benets from the mentioned risks, a generational fund that prefers a DB deal
can purchase a benet guarantee from other generational funds. The guarantee functions like a
series of put options that generate payos each time when assets are not sucient to pay for the
retirement benets.
Benet guarantee provides a channel to eliminate the downside risk of pension assets. On the
other hand, the mentioned risks can also lead to a surplus to a generational DB fund. This upside
risk can also be sold. For example, there is a possibility that a generational fund has experienced
favorable economic conditions during its lifetime, or the cohort lives shorter than expected, or the
average lifetime income rises higher than expected. In these case, after paying all its obligations,
the fund will end in surplus. A generational fund is designed to serve one birth cohort. Once all its
participants die, the fund will be automatically dissolved. This means the fund has to give up its
terminal assets (possibly to the plan). This is a waste to the fund because it is giving away assets
without any compensation. Thus a generational DB fund can sell a call option on the surplus of
its terminal assets to other generational funds. Incorporating the guarantee, a DB deal is formed
by buying a put and selling a call on top of a DC deal, which corresponds with ? who showed one
type of pension scheme can be modeled by another pension scheme and contingent claims.
Trading benet guarantees and call options between generational funds is essentially a realiza-
tion of intergenerational risk sharing. This is benecial to both sides as long as dierent generations
have a dierent appetite for risks. Option buyers can pay a price to eliminate unwanted risks and
6See Blake, Cairns & Dowd (2006) for a discussion of a limited range of current longevity-linked securities.
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option writers can earn a premium for taking the risks. As each generational fund is nancially
independent, pricing the guarantee and the surplus option of terminal asset in a fair way is essen-
tial in executing the intended risk sharing. If the price is fair, we assume there always exists a
counterparty for option trading, either the living generation or the future generation7. A suitable
fair price is the market-consistent price where the value of options are derived from the asset prices
used by the nancial market. This chapter provides a framework to price these options.
Any design of an insurance-like contract has to handle moral hazard and adverse selection
problems. The potential moral hazard problem makes it dicult for generational funds to buy
benet guarantees in the open market. For example, a generational fund after purchasing a benet
guarantee, may take excessive risks to maximize the upside potential while ignoring the downside
losses, which is at the expense of the guarantee provider. Solutions could be guaranteeing stan-
dardized portfolio or taxing excess return or subsidize the shortfalls of non-standardized portfolios
as proposed by Smetters (2002). In our case, the best solution is to have this guarantee provided by
the other generational funds under the same umbrella plan. Within the same plan all generational
funds are operated centrally. All the information and activities are administered and regulated
at the plan level by a group of representative trustees from each generational funds. The motive
to take advantage of each other is thus minimal and the moral hazard problem can be greatly
mitigated.
The best time to sign the contract on guarantee provision is at the establishment of a genera-
tional fund as soon as it has decided its contribution, indexation and investment policies. If a fund
can choose when to buy guarantees, they may want to time the market and this can lead to the
collapse of risk sharing. For example, if a fund has experienced a period of good investment returns,
the benet guarantee for this fund will be cheaper due to less possibility that the guarantee will
be eected. The fund also nds it is easy to buy a guarantee as it has accumulated much assets.
Such funds that are least in need of guarantee can either easily buy the guarantees or may not
buy them at all. On the contrary, if a fund has experienced a period of disappointing investment
returns, the benet guarantee on this fund will become expensive as there is a higher chance that
7To enable this arrangement and contracting between non-overlapping funds that prefer a DB deal, the parent
plan can serve as a nancial intermediary.
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the guarantee will be eected. The fund also nds it is dicult to buy a guarantee as its assets are
less than satisfactory. Such funds that are most in need of guarantees may not be able to buy the
guarantees. In equilibrium, the fund that can aord the guarantees nds it unnecessary to buy,
and the fund that needs the guarantees are not able to aord them. Then trading of guarantees
will not occur. Therefore to facilitate this risk sharing mechanism, the decision and the contract
to purchase the guarantees should be determined and signed at the fund establishment.
2.3 Intergenerational risk sharing
To elaborate the intergenerational risk sharing via contingent claims, we follow the spirit in Ponds
(2003) and present the generational account of a DB fund at two dates from the perspective of
participants. The rst is at the time of the fund closure. By then everything is realized and
known. The account at this time shows the ex post actual transfers between this generation and
the rest. The second is at the contracting time when a generational fund decides its deal concerning
contribution, indexation and investment policies, and accordingly the value of options related to
this fund are also determined. The value at this moment is derived from the economic value of the
items at the time of fund closure. We apply the value-based ALM in Hoevenaars & Ponds (2008)
that the value of assets and liabilities of a pension fund should account for their respective risks.
We use a "V" operator in the sequel to show the economic value of the items adjusted by their risks.
Readers can think of this value as the present value. The account expressed in economic values
at the fund establishment shows whether there exist a prior transfers and can signify whether the
fund strikes a fair deal for its participants.
A generational account at the fund disclosure looks like
P
(AR)
P
(C +R)
If the generation chooses a DB deal, pension benets
P
(AR) are dened according to a function
of an accrual rate, a life-time average salary and years of employment, and also represent what
participants actually receive. Contributions and investment returns
P
(C+R) are the actual amount
that this generation has accumulated over their lifetime. However,
P
(AR) are not necessarily all
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nanced by
P
(C + R) and
P
(C + R) are not necessarily all paid out as
P
(AR). To obtain
the specied benet payment, participants of a DB fund actually own a contingent claim, which
generates payos (PO) when the accumulated contributions and investment returns are lower than
the dened benets. With the benets specied by a formula independent from investment results,
there is also a possibility of positive assets left (POC) at the fund closure, and such assets will be
automatically transferred to other funds. Essentially participants are writing a call option on this
terminal surplus. Therefore the above account can be decomposed into the following under two
states of the world:
Generational account (1) at fund closure in case of an asset decitP
(ARself )
P
(C +R)
PO
and
Generational account (2) at fund closure in case of an asset surplusP
(AR)
P
(C +R)self
POC
In the account under the rst state of the world,
P
(ARself ) are the benets that can be aorded
by the accumulated assets
P
(C + R), namely
P
(ARself ) =
P
(C + R). PO is the payo of the
implicit benet guarantees when the accumulated assets are insucient to pay the dened benets.P
(ARself ) and PO together represent the total actual benets received by the participants that
are dened by the formula. The ex post actual net transfer (X) is then calculated as
P
(AR)self +
PO  P(C +R) = PO in this state of an asset decit.
In the account under the second state of the world,
P
(C +R)self are part of the total accumu-
lated contributions and returns that are used to nance the dened benets, namely
P
(C+R)self =P
(AR) . The rest of the total accumulations is represented by POC, which is transferred to other
funds. It can be be interpreted as the payo of the implicit surplus call when the accumulated
assets are more than sucient in paying the dened benets. The ex post actual net transfer (X)
is then calculated as
P
(AR) P(C +R)self   POC =  POC in this state of an asset surplus.
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At the time of fund establishment before guarantees or surplus options are realized, the gener-
ational account looks like:
Generational account (3) at the fund establishment
V (AR) V (C +R)
V (PO) V (POC)
At the contracting time, the economic value of contributions and investments equals the eco-
nomic value of the accrued rights, V (AR) = V (C + R), as the contribution rate is determined
in such a way that the dened benets can be fully nanced (even though ex post they are not
often matched). The economic value of the option payos is simply their respective market prices,
V (PO) = Pgua and V (POC) = Pcall. Therefore we can see that the net transfer ex ante is
V (X) = V (AR) + V (PO)  V (C +R)  V (POC) = Pgua   Pcall
The price of the guarantee (Pgua) and the price of the call (Pcall) are derived from the pension
deal once the fund has set its contribution, indexation and investment policy. If the price of the
guarantee (Pgua) is larger than the price of the call (Pcall), then the fund has a positive net transfer,
meaning the fund is a net receiver. If the value of the guarantee is smaller than the value of the
call, then the fund has a negative net transfer, meaning the fund is a net giver. Whether the net
transfer is 0 determines whether this DB deal is a fair contract. This also highlights the importance
of explicitly pricing the options in designing a fair plan, as put forward by Kocken (2006). In this
paper we try to price this guarantee and surplus call so that a generational DB fund can explicitly
trade them and strike a fair deal for its participants. The existence of the guarantee and the
call reveals the mechanism for intergenerational risk sharing in a generational plan, because the
deciency in assets is made up by guarantee providers and the surplus of terminal assets is left to
other generations. The magnitude of this risk sharing is Pcall + Pgua.
The above account is only for one generational fund. At the pension plan level, the consolidated
account is simply the aggregation of all individual accounts for each generational fund. Since
options are traded within the pension plan at their fair prices or market consistent prices, the
total net transfer (X) will be 0, making a generational plan with option arrangement a sustainable
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system. The zero-sum makes the generational plan resembles the collective plan that they are both
a self-contained system. What distinguishes a generational plan from a collective one is that the
transfers between generations are explicitly priced in the generational plan. Such prices quantify
intergenerational risk sharing and contribute to the sustainability of a pension plan. In a collective
plan there exist transfers between generations, but they are implicit and can lead to dierential
treatment to dierent generations. As a consequent some generations may opt out of the plan.
Our analysis of the generational account combines ideas from previous studies, but also distin-
guishes itself in the following aspects. Kocken (2006) detects implicit options embedded in pension
contracts but does not assign them to dierent generations. Hoevenaars & Ponds (2008) introduce
the generational account to study the transfers, but their focus is the change of the value of an
generational account due to a change of the pension deal. In addition, they study the value changes
for a generational account for a time window of 20 years, while we study the value transfers over
the entire life of a generation. Cui, de Jong & Ponds (2009) discuss the value transfers between
generations within a collective plan in the context that all generations apply the uniform poli-
cies in contribution, investment, and indexation. We show the value transfer from one particular
generation, and this transfer varies to the particular pension deal chosen by the generation.
3 Option payo structures
The last section shows the setup of the guarantee and surplus call option in a DB generational fund,
this section tries to value these options by modeling the development of the assets and liabilities
of a generational conditional DB fund. We explain how the values of the contingent claims are
determined. Guarantees to pension benets can take two forms: minimum rate of return guaran-
tees and minimum benet guarantees as summarized in Lachance & Mitchell (2003). In our setup,
the guarantees are of the second form. We allow for three types of guarantees: (1) guaranteeing
nominal pension benets, based on life-time average salaries and a replacement rate; (2) guaran-
teeing the accrued pension rights including previously granted conditional indexation rights; and
(3) guaranteeing unconditional real pension benets that are fully indexed to the ination rates.
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3.1 A conditional DB generational fund
We use a representative individual for a generation to model the development of a generational
fund. Assume a participant enters the labor market at T0, retires at Tr, and dies at Td. He earns
a at salary (S0).
The assets (At) grow due to contribution collections (ptS0) and investment returns (rA;t).
At = At 1(1 + rA;t) + ptS0 (1)
During the working years the liabilities change due to the change in accrued rights (ARt) and
the corresponding yield curve.
Lt =
Td TrX
n=0
ARt
(1 + yTr t+n;t)Tr t+n
(2)
where yTr t+n;t is the yield of maturity Tr   t+ n at time t.
ARt refers to accrued rights at time t, it is the future annual benets that is entitled to partic-
ipants since their retirement. In year 1 the accrued rights are AR1 = NAR(1+ ind1). From year 2
onwards until retirement the accrued rights are given by ARt+1 = (ARt+NAR)(1 + indt+1). indt
is the indexation rate. NAR is the newly accrued rights for one year of service and time indepen-
dent. If RR is the replacement rate, then for every year of service NAR is RR=(Tr   T0) S0. The
indexation rate in this study is bounded within [0,100%], so the accrued rights is always between
the nominal rights and real rights.
Upon retirement (t = Tr), the fund starts to pay out benets as dened in ARt and still invests
the rest. So the assets on the one hand decrease with the benet payments, while on the other
hand increase with the investment returns, and they follow
At = At 1(1 + rA;t) ARt (3)
No new rights are accrued as of retirement, NAR = 0. The total accrued rights only increase
with indexation ARt+1 = ARt(1+ indt+1). The value of the fund liabilities is the discounted value
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of the benet payments with a declining amount of years.
Lt =
Td tX
n=0
ARt
(1 + yn;t)n
(4)
At the end of each year, the funding ratio (FRt) is computed as At=Lt. Every year the con-
tribution rate pt and the indexation rate indt are determined according to a policy ladder, which
stipulates the values for pt and indt for the next year according to current funding ratio. This
policy ladder is often set by the fund at its establishment and xed for the whole life of the fund.
The dependency of indexation rate on the funding status reects the conditional feature of this DB
fund.
Without any arrangement of guarantees and surplus call option, the conditional DB fund will
not necessarily end in balance. The resulting decit or surplus will be transferred to the parent
plan or born by other generational funds. From this perspective, the conditional DB fund resembles
the DB plan in the Dutch practice. In the following description we model the payos of guarantees
and surplus call options that complete the DB fund to make it an independent plan. The value of
these options also reects the transfers between this fund and other funds.
3.2 Provision of three types of benet guarantees
This section presents the payo structure of various benet guarantees for a conditional DB gen-
erational fund. A benet guarantee can be seen as a series of put options, which are exercised at
the time of each benet payment. The underlying asset of the options is the pension assets. The
strike is the value of guaranteed benets.
We still use a representative individual to model the fund. During the working phase of its
participants, the fund's assets and liabilities follow the same path as described in Equations (1)
and (2). Upon retirement, the value of assets determines whether a put option is exercised, then
whether an option is excised determines the starting value of assets for the next period.
At the time before each benet payment, if the assets accumulated till that moment is lower
than the guarantee, the guarantee put option is exercised. The fund receives the dierence between
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the assets available and the guarantee. This amount is also the payo of the guarantee option. Then
the asset value for the next period becomes 0. If the asset value is not lower than the guarantee,
the fund assets will continue as specied in Equation (3). The following lists the payo of the
guarantees, the development of the asset value and the accrued rights during the payout phase.
When a nominal pension benet guarantee is provided, the minimum benets participants
receive are the nominal benets (ARnom). Depending on the assets at the time relative to the
nominal benets, the payo of each put option entailed by the nominal guarantee (POnomt ) is given
by8
POnomt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; for At(1 + rA;t)  ARt
0; for ARnom  At(1 + rA;t) < ARt
ARnom  At(1 + rA;t); for At(1 + rA;t) < ARnom
With the existence of guarantees, the actual benets received by participants depends on the
value of assets. Because the indexation rate is bounded within [0,100%], the accrued rights are
between nominal benets and real benets. When the value of assets is lower than the nominal
benets, nominal guarantee is eected and participants receive the nominal benets. When the
value of assets is higher than the nominal benets, but lower than the accrued rights, guarantee is
not eected, participants receive all the assets. When the value of assets is higher than the accrued
rights, nominal guarantee is eected and participants receive the accrued rights. Specically they
are
ARupdatedt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
ARt; for At(1 + rA;t)  ARt
At(1 + rA;t); for AR
nom  At(1 + rA;t) < ARt
ARnom; for At(1 + rA;t) < AR
nom
8Benets are paid at the end of the period, so at the time of option exercise the assets have already earned the
investment return.
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Accordingly the value of assets for the next period depends on how much benets are actually
paid. When the assets are less than the nominal benets, the fund pays the nominal benets by
using the money received from the guarantee. The assets for the next period is 0. In sum they are
given by
At+1 = At(1 + rA;t) ARupdatedt =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
At(1 + rA;t) ARt; for At(1 + rA;t)  ARt
0; for ARnom  At(1 + rA;t) < ARt
0; for At(1 + rA;t) < AR
nom
When an accrued pension rights guarantee is provided, the indexation won't be negative and
the accrued pension rights (ARt) are protected from any current and future cutdown. Participants
receive what they have accrued, namely ARupdatedt = ARt. The payo of this guarantee is
POARt =
8>><>>:
0; for At(1 + rA;t)  ARt
ARt  At(1 + rA;t); for At(1 + rA;t) < ARt
The assets for the next period becomes
At+1 = At(1 + rA;t) ARupdatedt =
8>><>>:
At(1 + rA;t) ARt; for At(1 + rA;t)  ARt
0; for At(1 + rA;t) < ARt
When a real pension benet guarantee is provided, participants always receive the real benets,
ARupdatedt = AR
real
t , as the real benets are the highest possible benets participants can receive
9.
The real benets are fully indexed to all the ination rates over time, ARrealt+1 = (AR
real
t +NAR)(1+
t+1) and t is the ination rate. The payo of this guarantee only depends on the comparison
9As indexation rate is not larger than 100%, ARt is not higher than AR
real
t .
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between the assets and the real benets. It is given as
POrealt =
8>><>>:
0; for At(1 + rA;t)  ARrealt
ARrealt  At(1 + rA;t); for At(1 + rA;t) < ARrealt
The assets for the next period is
At+1 = At(1 + rA;t) ARupdatedt =
8>><>>:
At(1 + rA;t) ARrealt; for At(1 + rA;t)  ARrealt
0; for At(1 + rA;t) < AR
real
t
We give a numerical example. Suppose now the fund is at the point to pay out its rst benets.
The assets accumulated till this moment is e40; 000. The nominal and real pension rights are
respectively e21; 000 and e80; 000, and the accrued rights till this moment is e60; 000. At this
point, the rst put option contained in a guarantee is to be expired. If the fund holds a nominal
guarantee, because the value of assets is larger than the minimum guarantee of nominal benets,
this rst put option is not exercised, the payo of the nominal guarantee at this moment is 0.
Participants should get the accrued rights, but the fund assets are not enough. Participants then
receive what the fund can aord, which is e40; 000. The starting value of assets for the next
period is 0. If the fund holds an accrued rights guarantee, because the value of assets is smaller
than the accrued rights, the rst put option contained in this guarantee is exercised, payo of
the accrued rights guarantee at this moment is e(60; 000   40; 000). Participants receive accrued
rights,e60; 000. The starting value of assets for the next period is 0. If the fund has a real benet
guarantee, because the value of assets is smaller than the real rights, the rst put option contained
in this guarantee is exercised, payo of the real guarantee at this moment is e(80; 000   40; 000).
Participants receive real benets, e80; 000. The starting value of assets for the next period is 0.
The value of liabilities is calculated in the same way as described in Equation (4).
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3.3 Selling the fund surplus
As mentioned, the generational fund is an independent fund. At the fund disclosure when all
participants die, the fund is dissolved automatically. If there are any assets left, then they would
be automatically transferred to the other funds or to the plan level for central planning. From the
perspective of the generational fund, this potential surplus is given away without compensation.
To avoid wasting resources, the fund can sell a call option on its terminal surplus. This call option
entitles the buyer any positive assets left with the fund at its closure. Using the previous setup the
payo of this call option (POC) is
POC = max(0; ATd(1 + rA;Td) ARupdatedTd )
As the value of assets varies to the guarantee arrangement, the value of the call also diers for
various guarantee arrangements.
4 Empirical methodology
Benet guarantees and surplus options are traded among generational funds within a common par-
ent plan, which forms an internal market. We assume a complete market that all states of liabilities
can be replicated within this internal market. We apply the risk neutral technique introduced by
Cox & Ross (1976). It says that in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, there exists a risk neutral
probability such that
V (t; Tr; Td) = e
 rft(T t) ~Et[
T=TdX
T=Tr
PO(T )] (5)
The left hand side is the value of the guarantees at time t and the guarantees are eective from the
retirement date (Tr) until the death date (Td). The guarantee functions like a number of Td Tr put
options. rft is the risk free rate at t. ~Et is the expectation taken at time t and under risk-neutral
measure. In its bracket is the sum of options which each has a payo at the time of each benet
payment. These payos are specied in the previous section. In the same way, the value of the
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surplus call at time t and expires at Td is
V C(t; Td) = e
 rft(Td t) ~Et[POC(Td)] (6)
The payos are generated in a risk neutral world when all investments are earning a risk free
rate. We specify the following stochastic process for stock returns, bond returns, yield curve and
ination in the risk-neutral world where risk premium is 0. We use the Vasicek model (1977) to
model the risk free rate. We choose this approach for yield curve modeling because it is based
on the no-arbitrage principle and suitable for pricing purpose. As the Vasicek model does not
preclude a negative rate, we apply this model to the real risk free rate. Then according to Fisher's
hypothesis, the nominal short rate is the sum of the real rate and expected ination rate. This
two-factor approach for the nominal rate is also applied by Campbell & Viceira (2001). Specically,
the real rate (rt) and expected ination (t) respectively follow:
rt+1 = r + (rt   r) + rt+1
t+1 =  + (t   ) + t+1
r and  are the long term means of the real rate and expected ination.  and  are mean reversion
coecients of the real rate and expected ination. The risk free rate is rft = rt + t.
According to the expectation theory, a long term rate is the average of expected future short
rates. Therefore we have the yield for m periods at t as
ym;t = r +  +
1  m
m(1  )(rt   r) +
1  m
m(1  )(t   )
Accordingly the return of a zero-coupon bond with m years to maturity follows
bondm;t =
pricem 1;t+1
pricem;t
  1 = exp(mym;t   (m  1)ym 1;t+1)  1
We assume pension funds invest in 10-year zero bonds. Assuming stock prices follow a lognormal
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distribution, then the annual stock return follows
stockt = exp(rft   2=2 + st )
rt+1, 

t+1, 
s
t are shocks to the real rate, expected ination and stock return respectively. Each
follows a standard normal distribution and is independent from each other.
Because the payos of the guarantees and the surplus call option are path-dependent on the
development of assets and liabilities, which are mediated by the contribution, indexation and in-
vestment polices set in the pre-specied policy ladder, it is hard to derive a closed-form solution
for the values. We make a numeric valuation with a Monte Carlo simulation. Such simulation
approach has been applied in various pension contexts in dierent countries10.
Specically, we simulate 1000 paths for stock returns and yield curves through the lifetime of
a generational fund. From the simulated yield curves we derive bond returns, together with the
simulated stock returns, we get the value for assets. Discounting accrued rights with the simulated
yield curves, we get the value for liabilities. Accordingly we obtain 1000 scenarios of option payos.
Discounting the payos at the risk free rates we get the present value of the options.
The values of all options will be determined at the time of its establishment as soon as the
fund has announced its contribution, indexation and investment policy. A fund can only trade
such options at this time by signing a contract with counter parties. However, they can fulll the
payment during the whole working phase. Of course the price will be higher the later they buy due
to the time value of money.
We collect all the data in an annual frequency over the period between year 1954 and 200711.
We take the 3-month US T-bill rate for the short nominal rate. The annual ination rate is
calculated from US Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers. This realized ination rate is
used to back out the expected ination assuming an AR(1) process. Then the real rate is obtained
as the dierence between the nominal rate and the expected ination rate according to the Fisher
10Consult Pennacchi (1999) for public and private pension funds guarantee in Uruguay and Chile, Feldstein &
Ranguelova (2000) for DC plan guarantee in the US, Lachance et al. (2003) for DC to DB conversion, Kocken (2006)
for option valuation in pension contracts.
11This is the period when all the data are available.
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hypothesis. From the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) of the University of Chicago
we get the stock return (including dividends), which is for a value-weighted portfolio including all
stocks traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. The parameter estimates are shown in Table
1.
5 Prices of guarantees and the call option
The options are designed to handle the investment risk, longevity risks, and labor income risks that
lead to the mismatch between assets and liabilities. Firstly we will present two sets of prices in a
baseline case when only diversiable nancial risks are considered. One set of prices is under the
assumption of a deterministic labor income, and the other is under a stochastic labor income. Then
starting from the base prices under deterministic labor income, we go on to show the sensitivities
of these prices when there is a generation-long shock to the nancial market reected by a higher
market volatility of the stock market; and the sensitivity when there is a longevity risk reected by
a stochastic life expectancy.
5.1 Base prices under a deterministic labor income
In the baseline case, the uncertainty of the assets and liabilities of a generational fund comes only
from the nancial market risks, which are represented by the yield curve and the stock market
described in the previous section. The assumptions on the fund and participants are specied in
Table 2. The entire life of a generational DB fund is 55 years. The rst 40 years are the working
phase when the fund collects contributions, and the later 15 years are the retirement phase where
the fund pays out retirement benets. The average of the participants earn a at salary (S0) over
the working years at e30,000. All cash ows occur at the end of each year, namely participants
get salary, pay contributions and receive pension benets all at the end of the year. The policy
ladder concerning contribution and indexation policy is dened in Figure 1. The contribution rate
is adjusted within a range of [-5%, 5%] around the base rate according to the funding ratio. In the
beginning when the funding ratio is above 6, the contribution rate is 5% lower than the base rate,
and is 5% higher when the funding ratio is lower than 1. Over time the upper bound of the funding
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ratio linearly declines to 2 at the time of retirement. The upper bound is set initially high at 6 in
the consideration of the mechanically low starting liabilities which otherwise lead to no contribution
requirement. Investment policy is set constant at 50% stocks and 50% bonds during the working
and retirement phase. The base contribution rate is determined in a actuarially fair way. It is
solved from
PTd
t=1 pS0(1+rt)
 t =
PTd
t=Tr
S0RR(1+rt)
 t, which says the lifetime individual pension
entitlements equals to lifetime individual pension contributions. Based on the historical mean real
rate of 1.27% as the discount rate (rt)
12 and 70% replacement rate (RR), the base contribution
rate (p) is set at 18.38%. The dynamics of the fund over time is shown in Figure 2 depicting the
average simulated contribution rate, indexation rate and various types of pension rights.
Panel A in Table 3 shows the prices of the three types of benet guarantees and the surplus
call under the three types of guarantees at the time of the rst contribution collection. When only
the nominal pension benet is guaranteed, namely participants can get at least 70% of the annual
salary after retirement, the guarantee costs for one time 4.17% of the yearly salary when purchased
at age 26, the time of the rst contribution payment. If paid in annual installment over the whole
working years, it is only 0.1%13 of the salary. Compared to the base contribution rate of 18%, this
nominal guarantee is only a marginal addition to the pension cost. The average paid benets are
e65,510, far over the nominal guarantee of e21,000. It reects the fact that the nominal guarantee
is not exercised most of the time. This low cost is expected because a real rate 1.27% is used as
the discount rate to set the base contribution rate to aord the real benets.
When the accrued pension rights are guaranteed, namely, participants at least maintain the
level of the previous year's benets, this guarantee costs for one time 12.11% of the yearly salary.
Such guarantee can provide an average annual benet of e68,219, about 86% of the real benets.
When the real pension benet is guaranteed, where participants get ination-proof benets,
it costs considerably 60% of the yearly salary. If paid in annual installment over 40 years, this
guarantee costs an annual amount of 1.5% of the salary.
12Pointed out in Queisser & Whitehouse (2006), the discount rate is a central and contentious issue in setting
contribution rate. In general there are three possible choices for the discount rate. They are market rate of return,
riskless interest rate and scally sustainable rate. Here we choose the real riskfree rate to make a conservative
calculation of contribution rate.
13=4.17%/40.
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Selling a call option on the surplus of the terminal assets, a generational fund can avoid wasting
the upside potential of its assets to generate an extra income to pay for the benet guarantees. In
general, the value of this call option on the fund surplus goes in a dierent direction from the value
of the benet guarantee. When the fund becomes auent, the value of the guarantees decreases
while the value of the call increases.
When a fund is provided with a nominal guarantee, the call option it can issue at the fund
establishment is worthy of 49.31% of the annual salary. For a fund provided with an accrued rights
guarantee, the call option is worth the same value. This is because the payo of a call option
only counts the upside potential, and this upside potential is the same for a fund with a nominal
guarantee and a fund with an accrued rights guarantee. The conditional DB plan denes that
participants get a high indexation when the value of assets are high. Therefore when the assets
develop to its up state, participants receive the same granted indexation when the fund is provided
with either a nominal or an accrued rights guarantee. The assets accordingly follow the same path
in the up states, leading to the same value of the surplus call option.
For a fund provided with a real guarantee, the call option is worth 47.31%, not much lower
than the call under the other two guarantee types. This is because the base contribution rate is
set to aim for real benets, which most of the time enables the fund to grant a high indexation.
This leads to little dierence between the surplus under a real guarantee and the surplus under the
other guarantees.
5.2 Base prices under a stochastic labor income
The previous case assumes a deterministic labor income. Now we incorporate an exogenous la-
bor income risk14. The shocks in the labor income can inuence the contributions and the asset
accumulation, accordingly will inuence the accrued rights and liabilities.
We apply a simple process for the labor income as St = E(S)  (1 + s+ t)15. St is the income
14Here we abstract from the endogeneicity that labor supply can vary with labor income shocks and the correlation
between the labor income shock and the investment return shock.
15Often used in literature is that labor income follows log normal distribution such as in Carroll (1997)and Viceira
(2001) that St+1 = Stexp(s+t+1). But in order to make it comparable to the baseline case we assume labor income is
normally distributed rather than being lognormally distributed, because the later assumption will lead to an increase
in the expected labor income even when the error term has a mean of 0.
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ow at year t. s is the expected income growth rate, and t follows NIID(0; 
2
 ). For the simulation
and comparison purpose we set S0 = 30; 000, s = 0 and  = 0:1
16.
The second set of prices in Panel A of Table 3 shows that the prices do not change much from the
base case with a deterministic labor income. This is because the average income is the same in both
cases and after 40 years of accumulation the distribution of assets and liabilities are comparable at
the time of retirement in both cases. In addition, the labor income risk does not inuence the fund
dynamics after retirement when the guarantee starts to be eective. Therefore a random income
shock from a standard normal distribution has negligible impact on the option prices.
5.3 Sensitivities to non-diversiable investment and longevity risks
The base prices of the guarantees and the call are based on the assumptions summarized in Table
2. This section relaxes some of the assumptions and considers two non-diversiable risks that the
generation has to share with other generations, namely the uncertainty on the nancial market and
the life expectancy.
There is a possibility that one generation could suer from a life-long shock from the nancial
market so that the generation cannot diversify such risk away within itself. We apply an alternative
value for the stock market volatility to reect this risk. We calculate the volatility of stock returns
within a 20-year window during our sample period and nd the highest volatility is 18.33%, which is
a 22% increase from 15.06% for the base case. The investment risk directly inuences the volatility
of assets both during the working phase and the post-retirement phase. This causes considerable
increases in the prices of the guarantees and the call, ranging from a 14% to a 43% increase. Figure
3 compares the payos of three types of guarantees under this scenario with the payos under the
base case. There is an increase in the payos irrespective of the guarantee type. Relatively the
percentage increase in the price of the nominal benet guarantee is the highest, and the percentage
increase in the price of the real benet guarantee is the lowest.
The average annual pension benets received by the participants under the macro-investment
risk, seen in the last two columns of Table 3, are lower than the base case because of the no catch-up
16This is taken from Viceira (2001).
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indexation in our pension design. More volatile assets under the investment risk will miss some
indexation which will not be made up later even when the value of assets picks up.
The base contribution rate is set based on the life expectancy of the generation. The uncertainty
in the life expectancy is a non-negligible risk. We incorporate this risk by making the life expectancy
a random variable from a normal distribution with a mean of 80 years and a standard deviation of
2 years.
When the generation has a lower life expectancy than the expected, the extra surplus assets
are transferred to other funds who bought a surplus call from this fund. When the generation
has a longer life expectancy than the expected, the fund policy is set as follows. For the years
after the expected life expectancy, no investment is made and no indexation is given. Under the
nominal guarantee, the fund aims to pay what it can aord, with the order of rstly the accrued
rights, secondly the less indexed rights, and lastly the nominal benets. Under the accrued rights
guarantee, the fund always pay the accrued rights as participants have accrued till the last year
of their expected life expectancy. Under the real guarantee, the fund still pays ination-indexed
benets, including the ination rate for these extra years.
Panel B in Table 3 shows that this longevity risk increases the prices of the guarantees con-
siderably. Figure 4 compares the average payos of three types of guarantees under this scenario
with the payos under the base case. In the base case, the payos stop at the expected death age
of 80. In the longevity case, the payos for short-lived years are on average lower than the payos
for long-lived years. Therefore the guarantee often pays more and accordingly more valuable when
there exists uncertainty on the life expectancy.
The impact of the longevity risk on the call option is negligible. This is because the call only
concerns the terminal assets when obligations to all participants are lled. The possibility of both
out-living and under-living the expected age leads to a non-signicant change in the average value
of the terminal assets.
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5.4 Net Transfers
A generational fund accommodates the needs of a particular generation. Buying a benet guarantee
protects its participants from non-diversiable generation-specic shocks. Selling a call option on
the fund surplus avoids under-consumption. Recalling the generational account of a DB deal at
the fund establishment, the net transfer a prior is determined by the dierence between the value
of the guarantee and the value of the call. A conditional DB deal in our numerical example is a
net giver when it is provided with either a nominal or an accrued rights guarantee, meaning this
fund transfers net positive values to other funds because the call it sells has a higher value than
the guarantee it receives. For a conditional DB deal with a real benet guarantee, the fund is a net
receiver, as the real guarantee it receives is more valuable than the call it sells. The above results
remains when the additional investment risk and longevity risk are considered.
To make the generational DB deal a fair deal, we should equalize the value of the guarantee
and the surplus call. This can be done via a change in the contribution, indexation or investment
policy, or simply pay or receive the dierence between the price of the guarantee and the price
of the surplus call. Here we give an example of doing so via a change in the contribution policy.
Table 4 reports the break-even base contribution rate that equalizes the value of the guarantee and
the value of the surplus call when the underlying fund has the characteristics dened in Table 2.
With this base contribution rate, a generational fund with a conditional DB deal does not have to
pay a cash outow explicitly for the guarantee or receive cash inow explicitly for the call. The
break-even base contribution under the nominal guarantee is 10.16%. It means if a generational
fund whose characteristics are dened as in the assumptions in Table 2 adopts a conditional DB
deal with a nominal guarantee, then this DB deal is a fair deal if it sets its base contribution rate
at 10.16%. It will be net giver(receiver) if its base contribution rate is higher(lower) than 10.16%.
For a fund with an accrued rights and a real benet guarantee, the break-even base contribution
rate is respectively 13.09% and 19.28%.
Comparing the value of the guarantee or the call under three types of guarantees, we nd the
value is highest in the case of a real guarantee provision. This reveals that the risk sharing among
generational funds is the highest when a real benet guarantee is traded, and is the lowest when
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only nominal benet guarantee is traded.
6 Conclusion and discussion
A generational pension fund enables customized fund management in contribution, indexation and
investment policies, facilitates risk management of a pension fund geared to the preference of a
particular generation, and frees pension sponsors from unwanted risks. To further improve the
welfare of participants, guaranteeing pension benets can be desirable. As a generational fund is
nancially independent, the upside potential of its terminal assets should also be sold to avoid under-
consumption. The arrangement of such options provides a mechanism for intergenerational risk
sharing, and this chapter tries to quantify this risk sharing by pricing the options. In the collective
plan, such options are implicitly embedded in the contract and can hardly be quantied. Our design
of option trading and their valuation in the setup of a generational plan makes intergenerational
risk sharing more explicit and transparent, and can be used as a reference to the risk sharing in
the current collective plan.
Applying risk-neutral and simulation techniques, we show that with a base contribution rate
determined by using a real rate as the discount rate the nominal and accrued rights guarantees
are relatively cheap. The one-time cost of the nominal benets guarantee is 4%, the accrued rights
guarantee is 12% and the real rights guarantee is 60% of the yearly salary. A call option written
on the surplus of the terminal assets is worth about 50% of the yearly salary for all types of the
benet guarantee. We consider another base case with a stochastic labor income that has the same
expected annual salary as in the deterministic labor income case. This has negligible impact on
the option prices as labor income shocks only inuence the fund assets till the retirement.
We also show the sensitivity of the option prices when some of the non-diversiable risks are
incorporated. We reect the generation-long shock in investment by increasing the volatility of the
stock returns to the historic highest in our sample period. This investment risk directly inuences
the volatility of the fund asset accumulation both during the working phase and the retirement
phase. This causes considerable increases in the prices of all guarantees and the surplus call.
We reect the longevity risk by making the life expectancy a random variable from a normal
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distribution. The uncertainty of the life expectancy leads to only a marginal change in the value
of the surplus call due to the two-side possibilities of realized life-time. However it increases the
prices of all benet guarantees considerably.
The explicit pricing of the contingent claims help to identify whether a deal is a fair deal ex
ante. To make a fair deal in a generational plan, a change can be made in the fund policies
concerning contribution, indexation, and investment, or a money dierence between the prices of
the guarantee and the surplus call can be paid. Regarding the DB deal in our example, we nd that
respectively at a break-even base contribution rate of 10.16%, 13.09% and 19.28%, a generational
fund featured in our base case with a deterministic labor income does not have to make explicit
cash ows for the options under nominal, accrued rights and real guarantee provisions. At these
rates, a conditional DB deal is a fair deal. The break-even values of the guarantees or the call also
reect that the intergenerational risk sharing is the highest when a real benet guarantee is traded
among generational funds.
In our evaluation, we actually assume a partial equilibrium that a generation only buy the
guarantee and sell a surplus call from and to a young or possibly an unborn generation. Yet in a
complete equilibrium, this generation can also be the seller of the guarantee and the buyer of the
surplus call to and from the current elder generations. In this case we should apply an overlapping
generation model with three generations, where each have their own deal concerning investment,
contribution and indexation policies.17 Nevertheless, this chapter provides a framework how the
contingent claims can be priced explicitly to make a fair deal.
The valuation of the options traded among generational funds is done under the complete market
assumption. This is a very restrictive assumption as replicating the option payos and a market
for continuous trading of the contingent claims can be hard to implement in practice. Hence our
current estimation only provides the rst proximate of their market values. The future research
can be in the direction of the valuation of such options under an incomplete market.
17Then there will be a concern over the credibility of the guarantee provider. Our primary solution is having the
parent plan acting as the intermediary to execute the trading and making the payo on behalf of the generational
funds.
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Table 1: Parameter estimates based on annual observations during 1954-2007
Real world Risk neutral world 
Real rate r=1.27% r=1.27% 1.50 %
=0.56 =0.56
rT=1.43%(initial value for simulation)
Expected ination =4.16% =4.16% 1.83%
=0.78 =0.78
T=4.12%(initial value for simulation)
Stock return 10.81% 5.43% 15.06%
r and  are the long term means,  and  are the mean reversion coecients of real rate and
expected ination.
Table 2: Assumptions for baseline scenarios
Parameters Values
Age of labor entry 25
Retirement age 65
Death age 80
Starting annual salary e30,000
Annual salary growth rate 0
Replacement rate 70%
Investment policy constant 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds
Risk free rate 5.43%
Base contribution rate 18.38%
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Table 3: Value of the guarantees and the call across dierent scenarios
Gua. type Guarantee Call Ann. B. % of real B.
Panel A
Base case with a deterministic labor income
Nominal guarantee 4.17 49.31 65,510 83.45
Accursed rights gua. 12.11 49.31 68,219 85.84
Real guarantee 59.34 47.31 83,652 100
Base case with a stochastic labor income
Nominal guarantee 4.17 49.39 65,517 83.45
Accursed rights gua. 12.10 49.39 68,225 85.84
Real guarantee 59.32 47.32 83,652 100
Panel B
Sensitivity to investment risk
Nominal guarantee 5.98 60.70 63,709 81.32
(43.47% ) (23.09%)
Accursed rights gua. 15.99 60.70 67,028 84.35
(32.11%) (23.09%)
Real guarantee 67.69 57.99 83,652 100
(14.08%) (22.58%)
Sensitivity to longevity risk
Nominal guarantee 5.42 49.64 63,981 81.69
(29.95%) (0.66%)
Accursed rights gua. 17.65 49.64 67,170 84.4
(37.55%) (0.66%)
Real guarantee 66.92 44.49 84,423 100
(12.78%) (-5.96%)
The table reports the prices of the nominal benet, accrued rights, and real benet guarantees
and the surplus call option by simulating a generational conditional DB fund. Panel A reports
the prices for the base cases respectively with a deterministic and a stochastic labor income. The
assumptions for the base case are specied in Table 2 and Figure 1. Panel B reports the prices
when the uncertainties in the volatility of the stock market and the life expectancy are considered.
Specically, in considering the investment risk we increase the volatility of the stock market to
the highest 20-year volatility in the sample period. In considering the longevity risk, we make the
life expectancy a random variable with a nominal distribution that has a mean of 80 years and
a standard deviation of 2 years. "Guarantee" and "Call" are the one-time price of the benet
guarantee and the call respectively at the time of rst contrition collection, expressed as as a
percentage of the average annual salary. "Ann. B" displays the average annual benets expressed
in ethat participants receive since their retirements, and its average percentage of the fully indexed
benets/real benets is shown in the last column. Numbers in brackets are the change in value
when compared with the base case with a deterministic labor income
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Table 4: Break-even base contribution rate
Contribution rate Value of guarantee Value of call
Nominal guarantee 10.16% 10.87% 10.86%
Accrued rights gua. 13.09% 19.97% 19.98%
Real guarantee 19.28% 54.41% 54.43%
The table reports the break-even base contribution rate that equalizes the value the guarantee
and the value of the call under DB deal with a nominal benet, accrued rights, and real benet
guarantee respectively. The last two columns report the resulting values of the guarantee and the
call, which should be the same.
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Figure 1: Contribution and indexation policy in the generational plan
The contribution rate is adjusted between [-5%, 5%] above the base rate depending on the funding
ratio of [100%, upper bound (t)]. This upper bound is time varying running from 600% at T0 to
200% at Tr. The right graph shows the indexation ratio. No indexation to the ination is granted
when the funding ratio is below 100%, and a full indexation is granted when the funding ratio is
higher than 110%. A linear rule applies when the funding ratio is between 100% and 110%.
33
26 35 45 55 65 75 80
0
0.1
0.2
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
ra
te
26 35 45 55 65 75 80
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
In
de
xa
tio
n 
ra
tio
26 35 45 55 65 75 80
0
5
10
15
x 104
Age
Pe
ns
io
n 
rig
ht
s
Figure 2: Fund dynamics in the base case with a deterministic labor income
The Figure shows the average simulated contribution rate, indexation ratio and pension rights over
the life time of a generational fund. In the lowest graph, the solid line shows the path of the
nominal pension rights. The dotted line shows the path of the accrued pension rights. The starred
line shows the path of the real pension rights.
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Figure 3: Payo comparison between the base case and the investment risk case
The lowest set shows the average payos in euros of the nominal benet guarantee. The middle set
of the lines shows the payos in euros of the accrued rights guarantee. The upper set of the lines
shows the payos in euros of the real benet guarantee. The solid line represents the base case,
and the dotted line represents the case incorporating additional investment risk.
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Figure 4: Payo comparison between the base case and the longevity risk case
The lowest set shows the average payos in euros of the nominal benet guarantee. The middle set
of the lines shows the payos in euros of the accrued rights guarantee. The upper set of the lines
shows the payos in euros of the real benet guarantee. The solid line represents the base case,
and the dotted line represents the case incorporating longevity risk.
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